I am trying

to be openminded. I've realized that I was an atheist and did not want to do anything associated with religions. My humanities paper from last year was basically from an atheist's point of view and this whole time I thought I were just agnostic. Well here is something that totally invalidates my argument in my paper last year:

“Religious belief is too culturally and historically conditioned to be ‘truth.’ ”

When I first came to New York City nearly twenty years ago, I more often heard the objection that all religions are equally true. Now, however, I’m more likely to be told that all religions are equally false. The objection goes like this: “All moral and spiritual claims are the product of our particular historical and cultural moment, and therefore no one should claim they can know the Truth, since no one can judge whether one assertion about spiritual and moral reality is truer than another.” The sociologist Peter L. Berger reveals the serious inconsistency in this common assumption.

In his book A Rumor of Angels Berger recounts how the twentieth century had uncovered “the sociology of knowledge,” namely that people believe what they do largely because they are socially conditioned to do so. We like to think that we think for ourselves, but it is not that simple. We think like the people we most admire and need. Everyone belongs to a community that reinforces the plausibility of some beliefs and discourages others. Berger notes that many have concluded from this fact that, be- cause we are all locked into our historical and cultural locations, it is impossible to judge the rightness or wrongness of competing beliefs.
Berger goes on, however, to point out that absolute relativism can only exist if the relativists exempt themselves from their own razor.9 If you infer from the social conditionedness of all belief that “no belief can be held as universally true for everyone,” that itself is a comprehensive claim about everyone that is the product of social conditions—so it cannot be true, on its own terms. “Relativity relativizes itself,” says Berger, so we can’t have relativ- ism “all the way down.”10 Our cultural biases make weighing com- peting truth-claims harder, yes. The social conditionedness of belief is a fact, but it cannot be used to argue that all truth is completely relative or else the very argument refutes itself. Berger concludes that we cannot avoid weighing spiritual and religious claims by hiding behind the cliché that “there’s no way to know the Truth.” We must still do the hard work of asking: which affirmations about God, human nature, and spiritual reality are true and which are false? We will have to base our life on some answer to that question.

The philosopher Alvin Plantinga has his own version of Berg- er’s argument. People often say to him, “If you were born in Mo- rocco, you wouldn’t even be a Christian, but rather a Muslim.” He responds:
Suppose we concede that if I had been born of Muslim parents in Morocco rather than Christian parents in Michigan, my beliefs would have been quite different. [But] the same goes for the pluralist. . . . If the pluralist had been born in [Morocco] he probably wouldn’t be a pluralist. Does it follow that . . . his pluralist beliefs are produced in him by an unreliable belief- producing process?11
Plantinga and Berger make the same point. You can’t say, “All claims about religions are historically conditioned except the one I am making right now.” If you insist that no one can determine which beliefs are right and wrong, why should we believe what you are saying? The reality is that we all make truth-claims of some sort and it is very hard to weigh them responsibly, but we have no alternative but to try to do so. 

from The Reason for God Belief in an Age of Skepticism by Timothy Keller